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In this research, we propose to estimate the water pollution abatement cost 
functions where the pollution regulations are not perfectly enforced. A number of 
estimation problems in the existing literature are improved, including: (1) failure to 
rely on data from behavioral objective of polluting firms; (2) lack of the use of 
plant-level data to estimate abatement cost functions; (3) pollution concentration 
rather than pollution reduction load to be the output of abatement activity; and (4) 
implausible assumption of perfectly enforceable regulations. In particular, we stress 
that under imperfectly enforceable regulations, estimates of the abatement cost 
function are biased upward if self-reporting data are used to estimate directly. To 
improve the estimation, we add a nonnegative component u into the error term (in 
addition to the traditional random one) to catch the unobservable effect of 
concealment on emitted pollution. The resulting maximum-likelihood estimators are 
consistent and asymptotically efficient. 
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because there is a strong possibility of the firms over-reporting their abatement costs in the belief that 
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??? ?????? ??? ?????? ?????? ???
COD 154.7667 975.4586 1.0050 37463.5800 5577 
??? 6.3775 7.4003 1.0260 30.5760 31 
? 9.5049 32.1073 1.0115 273.6000 93 
?? 6.6735 16.7720 1.0312 109.6708 44 
? 9.4104 30.2170 1.0043 222.3907 131 














??  Cobb-Douglas?????? 
?? COD ??? ? ?? ? SS 
??? 13.720** 5.163 5.754 -328.339 -508.434 -9.001** 
 (9.421) (0.027) (1.045) (-0.005) (0.000) (-7.350) 
???? 0.121* 2.737 3.576* -36.239 26.507 0.483* 
 (1.669) (0.052) (1.680) (-0.022) (1.035) (1.866) 
λ  1034.504 2.503 20002441.400 0.262 0.040 3294653.232 
σ  600.181 677.035 686.522 511.005 501.447 617.505 
Log-likelihood -39728.040 -224.546 -674.933 -335.912 -1000.308 -1759.256 
???????? t??**??? 5%?????*??? 10%????? 
??  ?????????? 
?? COD ??? ? ?? ? SS 
??? 12.594 -345.553 5.173 -224.660 -470.249 -999.002 
 (0.789) (-0.010) (0.050) (-0.001) (0.003) (-7.504) 
???? 1.047 -208.357 5.610 -424.379 -43.459 -0.109 
 (0.255) (-0.422) (0.216) (-0.483) (-0.084) (1.000) 
???? 2 -0.118 99.607 -1.006 99.144 16.584 0.050 
 (-0.119) (0.473) (-0.120) (0.456) (0.086) (0.021) 
λ  17253153.170 0.263 1893877.884 0.072 0.035 1504777.654 
σ  600.389 491.893 685.699 482.341 500.478 617.614 
Log-likelihood -39726.410 -235.481 -674.829 -334.221 -1000.070 -1759.256 
???????? t??**??? 5%?????*??? 10%????? 
